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IN THE UTAH COU RT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
y 
PAFYI, |s| PTEFrF , 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 940749-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This : appeal from conv ^ - * possessi^ ~ a 
i 
violation :. ~:e A:::, 
faili^-p r af4"jv -- ' 3-_ - ,-.+ »- *,.. r jbstanc°r —--
This Court has jurisdiction • a^  1 - - under \lza:\ 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue on. appeal i s whether the tria] court clearly 
erred :i n determining that defendant's air .- - s \ \ :ii t l i:i 1: 1 
:
 .I an abandonment of his expectation 
p:.:\.-*c\ n ehicle itself. 
Abandonment is a factual issue whic 
.JL±I . . Anderson, ) 
("abandonment is us.al" -. - ' :~- State ex rel. M.S. 
v Lochner, 815 P 2d 
determination of abandonment parental a^px _ ^. n proceeding 
for clear error). See also United States v. Hernandez, . ..3d 
944, 947 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Ruiz, 935 F.2d 982, 
984 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 
1560 (11th Cir. 1989). Notwithstanding, even assuming the Court 
were to adopt a bifurcated approach, viewing a trial court's 
determination that a particular set of facts gives rise to an 
abandonment as a legal determination, the trial court's 
determination is accorded deference. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 939 (Utah 1994) ("it is not within the appellate court's 
authority to review de novo the factual underpinnings of a motion 
to suppress [,]" and "it'will never be appropriate for an 
appellate court to overturn a trial court's factual 
determinations when they have substantial record support"). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance (marijuana), a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1994); failure to affix 
official controlled substances stamp, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-103 (1992); and, speeding, a 
class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46 
(Supp. 1994) (R. 1-2). 
2 
Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained ii 1 alleged 
violation of his rights under federal . " state constitutional 
evidential j nearing , mattei *• ;:.,,. cc ,.: : denied the 
motion (R. 8 0 84) . 
Thereafter. dp I" f.jndr)nt ei it. e r e d a condi!' J ona L < |i 11. "1 t.y pi e.-i I i 
the felony offenses 85-86) The trial court sentenced 
defendar* • .-=:•".- -* term, not to exceed fa ve years and various 
' rl: 1 Ei:!! t 3 1 [ I I i 1 3l S tl ] 
defendant was placed on probation (R, 87-88) ,:] 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Tl le ti: :i a] c ::)"i 11: !:  • s i i i ] :i i lg dei i> :ii i l g 1:1 i = n ic ti c i i t :: • suppi ess 
^r~:;rateiy r e c c e s i.e pertinent facts (R. 80-84). The court ~ 
•~ ~1 findings are therefore reproduced here, adding citations 
on tli Ei: m :: t: :i :: n t :: sn lppre s s : 
1. [Defendant's] vehicle was observed by Trooper 
Eldredge ( "Eldredge" ) northbound on State Highway II 9] 
at 71 miles per hour (R. 309). 
2. Eldredge stopped the vehicle and appj^oacheci a late 
model Lincoln Continental driven by [defendant]. 
[Defendant] was the only occupant (R, 3 09- 10) 
3. [Defendant] admitted driving at an excessive speed 
4. while Eldredge -was asking [defendant] where he was 
going and getting drivers license and registration, 
[defendant] stated that he had been to his 
grandmother's funeral in Tucson, Arizona (R. 3 1 0 ) . 
Although defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to 
two third degree felonies, it appears the court only imposed 
sentence for one third degree felony (R. 87-88) . Defendant 
entered an unconditional plea to the speeding offense (R. 8 8 ) . 
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5. [Defendant] stated that he signed a contract with a 
drive away company and was delivering the vehicle to 
the owner in New Jersey. [Defendant] stated that the 
owner had left Tucson because he had become ill and 
that he had flown back home. Eldredge observed a large 
suitcase and golf clubs in the back seat. Eldredge 
asked [defendant] whose belongings those were to which 
[defendant] answered, "they all belong to the owner, 
the only thing that is mine is the blue black pack11 (R. 
310-11, 326) . 
6. [Defendant] meant by that statement to communicate 
to Eldredge that the only thing in the car belonging to 
him was the blue back pack (R. 311-12). 
7. Eldredge did not immediately note that the drive 
away agreement contained [defendant's] name (R. 312). 
8. [Defendant] also said he was trying to get home to 
be with his sick grandmother in Pennsylvania (R. 313). 
9. [Defendant] told Eldredge that he was delivering 
the car to someone designated by the owner, and that he 
did not know the name of that person (R. 312-13). 
10. Eldredge expressed his concern about the route 
that [defendant] was using to reach New Jersey (R. 
321) .2 
11. Eldredge's suspicion with regard to a possible 
stolen vehicle was "not reasonable, because he failed to 
carefully examine the drive away agreement. 
12. It is not unreasonable that [defendant] did not 
know to whom he was delivering the vehicle. An 
individual was indicated on the drive away agreement 
and that name had been changed and the change initialed 
by the owner. 
13. [Defendant] was more nervous than the usual 
detainee, exhibited by his failure to look at the 
officer and his shaking hands and his overall body 
language (R. 314, 323). 
14. Absent controlling precedent the Court would find 
that reasonable suspicion did arise from the anxiety of 
2
 Trooper Eldredge noted that rather than driving through 
San Juan County, the more common route to New Jersey would have 
been to take I-10 east from Tucson along the coast to an 
interstate that would have taken defendant north (R. 321). 
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[defendant], his inconsistent story and (but only very 
slightly) his choice of route from Tucson, Arizona to 
Pennsylvania. 
15. Because of the controlling precedent, the Court 
finds that the officer did not have reasonable 
suspicion of additional criminal activity. 
16. [Defendant] was asked to go back to the patrol 
vehicle while the speeding ticket was being written out 
(R. 313, 327). 
17. It is the common practice of Eldredge to have the 
person proceed to the patrol vehicle on speeding 
violations (R. 327, 329). 
18. Seven or eight minutes had elapsed from the stop 
of the vehicle when Eldredge asked whether there were 
any firearms or any contraband in the vehicle. Those 
questions did not increase the length of [defendant's] 
detention.3 
19. [Defendant] stated that there were no firearms or 
contraband. Eldredge then put aside his ticket book 
and asked for consent to search for such contraband. 
[Defendant] said[,] "[S]ure, no problem" (R. 317-318). 
20. Eldredge then pulled out a consent to search form, 
read it to [defendant] and had [defendant] review the 
form. [Defendant] consented to the search and stated 
upon request to search. The officer told [defendant] 
that he would have to sign the form before the officer 
would be able to search the vehicle (R. 316, 329-330). 
21. [Defendant] understood what his legal rights were, 
and understood that he could refuse to consent to the 
vehicle search (R. -317, 338, 343-45). 
22. [Defendant] was told by Eldredge that he could not 
search without [defendant] signing the form (R. 315-17, 
332-33) . 
23. With regard to the consent the Court finds that: 
A. Eldredge did not claim any right to search. 
3
 Trooper Eldredge clarified that he asked the above 
question in the course of writing out the speeding citation, 
after defendant's disclaimer of all items within the vehicle 
except the blue backpack (R. 309-319, 328). 
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B. That there was no force or coercion exerted by 
Eldredge. 
C. That Eldredge's request was phrased as a request, 
not commanded. 
D. That [defendant] cooperated in allowing Eldredge to 
search. 
E. That there was no deception or trick by Eldredge in 
requesting the search (R. 315-18, 332-33) . 
24. The Court finds that the consent to search was 
voluntary. However, the Court finds that at the time 
the consent was asked for that [defendant] had been 
detained and was not free to go. In view of the 
decision of the Court of Appeals in [State v. Castner, 
825 P.2d 699 (Utah App. 1992)] the Court finds that 
Eldredge violated [defendant's] constitutional rights 
by asking this consent to search. 
25. There was no flagrant violation in requesting 
consent. However, the consent was closely connected in 
time and sequence to the stop for the speeding ticket 
and there was no intervening circumstance or lapse of 
time that would attenuate the consent from the 
violation. 
26. On the issue of standing or abandonment, the Court 
considers the facts as known to Eldredge when he 
conducted the search. 
27. [Defendant] made a statement that the only 
property that belonged to him was a blue back pack, 
intending the officer to understand since [defendant] 
was driving another's car that the only item in the 
vehicle owned by [defendant] was the blue back pack (R. 
311-12). 
28. The Court finds that [defendant] abandoned any 
claim to or expectation of privacy in items or articles 
in the rear seat and trunk other than the blue back 
pack and the area immediately around his person. It 
was reasonable for Eldredge to accept this 
abandonment.4 
4
 The trial court's oral ruling clarifies that defendant 
disclaimed items within the vehicle prior to the illegal 
detention (R. 374-75) . 
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29. At the time of the stop and conversation with 
Eldredge[,] [defendant] intended to distance himself 
from the ownership of any of the other materials within 
the vehicle. His later admissions that he knew of the 
marijuana are irrelevant to this inquiry. 
(R. 80-84) (a complete copy of the ruling is attached as 
Addenda). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court clearly erred in determining that 
defendant's statement disclaiming a privacy interest in all items 
within his vehicle except for a blue back pack constituted an 
abandonment of his privacy interest in the vehicle itself. The 
Court's extrapolated ruling is not supportable on the record nor 
by pertinent authority. Moreover, as the authorized driver of 
the vehicle, defendant retained standing to contest the vehicle 
search. 
Consequently, because the trial court also found that the 
trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to detain defendant and that 
defendant's otherwise voluntary consent to search was 
insufficiently attenuated from the illegal detention, the State 
is bereft of any alternative argument that would justify the 
trooper's intrusion into the trunk of defendant's vehicle. 
Accordingly, this Court -should issue an unpublished opinion 
summarily reversing the trial court's denial of defendant's 
suppression motion and remanding the case with the direction that 
defendant be allowed to withdraw his conditional guilty plea. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
A. In Light of the State's Confession of Error, The 
Court Need Not Determine the Standard for Abandonment 
Defendant challenges the propriety of the trial court's 
determination that his statement disclaiming all items in the 
vehicle except for the blue back pack constituted an abandonment 
of his expectation of privacy in the vehicle itself. In making 
his argument, defendant relies upon State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 
(Utah App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 
1992), for two propositions: 1) that abandonment is measured from 
the defendant's subjective state of mind, and 2) that the State 
must prove abandonment by "clear, unequivocal and decisive 
evidence." Br. of App. at 20, 26. Rowe is not consistent with 
the majority view on either issue. See United States v. 
Hernandez, 7 F.3d 944, 947 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1983) (Abandonment is an 
objective determination based on the facts available to police at 
the time of the search), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 859 (1983); 
United States v. Rem, 984 F.2d 806, 810-11 n.2 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(collecting federal circuit cases), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 300 
(1993) . Accord United States v. Perkins, 871 F. Supp. 801, 803 
(M.D.Pa. 1995). See also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 
(1984) ("preponderance of the evidence" standard is applicable in 
considering the inevitable discovery exception to the 
exclusionary rule); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 
8 
n.14 (1974) (in reviewing the voluntariness of a consent to 
search, the "controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings 
should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of 
the evidence"). Accord State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 
1992) ("The State bears the burden of proving common authority, 
and it must do so by a preponderance of the evidence."); State v. 
Delanev, 869 P.2d 4, 9 (Utah App. 1994) (recognizing Brown's 
approval of preponderance standard). 
However, the Court need not address the above issues because 
the State confesses that the trial court's abandonment 
determination is clearly erroneous. State ex rel. M.S. v. 
Lochner, 815 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah App. 1991). The narrow nature 
of the State's confession of error in this case is illustrated by 
the fact that the State does not dispute the trial court's 
additional findings rejecting defendant's consent to search as an 
alternative justification for the vehicle search (R. 82-84), see 
addendum A. Indeed, the trial court's factually sensitive 
determinations that the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to 
detain defendant beyond the initial traffic purpose of the stop 
and that defendant's voluntary consent to search was 
insufficiently attenuated from the illegal detention are accorded 
broad deference on appeal. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 
n.4 (Utah 1994) (conveying a "measure of discretion" to trial 
court's reasonable suspicion determination, declining to conduct 
"close, de novo review[,]" and recognizing that "it will never be 
appropriate for an appellate court to overturn a trial court's 
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factual determinations when they have substantial record 
support"); State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271-72 (Utah 1993) 
(attenuation conclusion reviewed for correction while underlying 
factual findings reviewed for clear error). As a consequence of 
the above findings and because the record on appeal supports no 
other Fourth Amendment justification for the vehicle search,5 
the State confesses that the trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress was erroneous. 
B. Defendant Retained An Expectation of Privacy in His 
Vehicle 
The trial court made the following factual determinations 
regarding defendant's expectation of privacy in items inside the 
vehicle and in the vehicle itself: 
5. . . . [Trooper] Eldredge observed a large suitcase 
and golf clubs in the back seat. Eldredge asked 
[defendant] whose belongings those were to which 
[defendant] answered, "they all belong to the owner, 
the only thing that is mine is the blue back pack." 
6. [Defendant] meant by that statement to communicate 
to Eldredge that the only thing in the car belonging to 
him was the blue back pack. 
27. [Defendant] made a statement that the only 
property that belonged to him was a blue back pack, 
intending the officer to understand[,] since 
[defendant] was driving another's car[,] that the only 
item in the vehicle owned by [defendant] was the blue 
back pack. 
5
 Because defendant only nominally alluded to his state 
constitutional rights below, State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 
(Utah App. 1990), and because the States' confession of error is 
predicated upon established Fourth Amendment law, resolution of 
the case does not require an analysis of state constitutional 
provisions. 
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28. The Court finds that [defendant] abandoned any 
claim to or expectation of privacy in items or articles 
in the rear seat and trunk other than the blue back 
pack and the area immediately around his person and it 
was reasonable for Eldredge to accept this abandonment. 
(R. 81, 84), see addenda. The court's oral ruling suggests that 
absent defendant's disclaimer of items within the vehicle, it 
viewed defendant as having standing to contest the vehicle 
search: 
In examining the standing question, . . . there are just 
general statements that if someone has a right — general 
statements in the cases that if someone has exhibited the 
right to have the vehicle and control the vehicle, he has an 
expectation of privacy in the vehicle or everything in it. 
And that would ordinarily apply here, but in this case, we 
have the additional factor that that was narrowed down by 
the defendant's own statements. He made a statement 
intending the officer to understand, and the officer did, in 
fact, understand that the only thing in this vehicle which 
belonged to someone else, which he would have a brief period 
of time, was his backpack. And I find from that -- I'm 
looking — I think the proper way to examine that question 
from the standpoint of what the officer -- I cant' expect 
the officer to predict what will happen after that. 
And, so I find that the defendant had standing only 
with respect to the backpack, the blue backpack, with 
regard to everything else, he abandoned any claim of 
the right of privacy or the expectation of privacy by 
the statement that he made to the officer. 
(R. 374-75). 
Contrary to the trial court's apparent reasoning, 
defendant's standing to contest the vehicle search did not 
dissipate when he abandoned items within the vehicle. Rather, as 
the authorized driver of the vehicle defendant retained standing 
to challenge the search. State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 915 
(Utah App. 1992) ("a driver who has permission to use a vehicle 
and has personal belongings in the car has a reasonable 
11 
expectation of privacy in the car and its contents"). State v. 
Matison, 875 P.2d 584, 588-89 (Utah App. 1994) (recognizing 
Matison's standing to challenge search of vehicle trunk and 
remanding for a determination of whether Matison abandoned his 
expectation of privacy in suitcases seized therefrom). 
In light of defendant's standing to contest the vehicle 
search, it remained necessary for the trial court to justify the 
trooper's intrusion into the trunk. The trial court apparently 
believed that its abandonment determination was sufficient to 
that end. It is not clear whether the court viewed defendant's 
disclaimer of any privacy interest in the items contained within 
the vehicle (except for the blue back pack) to include a 
disclaimer of his privacy interest-in the vehicle itself, or 
whether the court viewed defendant's disclaimer as negating the 
need to justify the trunk search (R. 81, 84, 374-75), see 
addenda. For reasons set forth below, under either view, the 
trial court's abandonment ruling fails to justify the trooper's 
intrusion into the trunk of defendant's vehicle. 
C. Clearly Erroneous Abandonment Ruling 
The test for abandonment is whether an individual, through 
his words and acts, has retained any reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the object to be searched. Hernandez. 7 F.3d at 947. 
In the present case, both the trooper and defendant were 
specifically focused on items in the back seat of the car when 
defendant made his statement disclaiming all items but the blue 
back pack (R. 310). Moreover, as noted previously, defendant 
12 
claimed authority to have the vehicle and produced a drive-away 
agreement as proof of that authority (R. 312). See Sepulveda, 
842 P.2d at 915. Defendant at no time expressly, or even 
implicitly, disclaimed his expectation of privacy in the vehicle 
itself. See, e.g., United States v. Huffhines, 967 F.2d 314, 318 
(9th Cir. 1992) (defendant abandoned privacy interest in Chevy 
Blazer when defendant denied ownership or knowledge of the 
Blazer, claimed that keys found on his person were to another 
vehicle, and stated that he had just been dropped off at the 
scene by a friend); United States v. Sweeting, 933 F.2d 962, 964 
(11th Cir. 1991) (defendants' disclaimed privacy interest in 
residence by claiming that residence was owned by their mother, 
occupied by their grandmother, and that they did not reside 
therein); United States 'v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th 
Cir. 1989) (defendant's repeated disclaimer of any knowledge of 
or interest in vehicle constituted abandonment of same); Sullivan 
v. State, 564 S.W.2d 698, 701-02 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) 
(defendant disclaimed expectation of privacy in Cadillac parked 
four feet from where he was standing at time of his arrest by 
denying any contact or connection with Cadillac and stating that 
it was not his car). 
In light of the above, the record does not reasonably 
support the determination that defendant abandoned his 
expectation of privacy in the vehicle itself. The most that can 
be said of defendant's statement is that he disclaimed his 
privacy interest in all items within the vehicle except the blue 
13 
back pack. Because the scope of the trial court's abandonment 
ruling is not supportable it is clearly erroneous. 
D. No Alternative Justification For Vehicle Search 
Even if the trial court did not view defendant's disclaimer 
of items within the vehicle to encompass an abandonment of his 
privacy interest in the vehicle itself, the court's ruling still 
fails to provide any alternative justification for the trunk 
search. Defendant's abandonment of items within the vehicle 
simply does not excuse the necessity of providing a Fourth 
Amendment justification for the intrusion into the trunk itself. 
See, e.g., Matison, 875 P.2d at 589 (remanding for entry of 
findings concerning both Matison's abandonment of trunk luggage 
and sufficiency of attenuation for Matison's consent to search). 
On the other hand, if the trial court had determined either 
that there was reasonable suspicion for defendant's detention, or 
that defendant's voluntary consent to search was sufficiently 
attenuated from the illegal detention, the trunk search would 
have been justified under the consent exception to the warrant 
requirement. State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 703 (Utah App. 
1992) ("Consent is a recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement."). Having justified the trunk search, the trooper's 
further seizure of the trunk luggage would have been justifiable 
as a consequence of defendant's abandonment of his privacy 
interest therein. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 
(1960) (warrantless seizure of abandoned property is not 
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unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment)• Accord United States 
v. Piaget, 915 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1990) (probable cause and 
exigent circumstances justified vehicle trunk search and 
defendant's statements disclaiming luggage therein justified 
seizure of the same); United States v. McBean, 861 F.2d 1570, 
1574 (11th Cir. 1988) (defendant's abandonment of trunk luggage 
precluded challenge to the legality of consensual trunk search). 
However, because the trial court invalidated defendant's 
consent to search, and because defendant's disclaimer of items 
within the vehicle does not itself justify intrusion an into the 
trunk, the State is bereft of any argument that the instant 
search was justified under the Fourth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the State requests that the Court issue 
an unpublished opinion summarily reversing the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to suppress and remanding the case 
with the direction that defendant be allowed to withdraw his 
conditional guilty plea. Additionally, no oral argument is 
requested. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3Q day of J«±£f 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San Juan County 
FlLED
 AUG 1 6 199*1 
CRAIG C. HALLS #1317 
San Juan County At torney CLERK OF THE COURT 
P . 0 . Box 850 BY oipUij 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Phone 587-2128 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH * 
Plaintiff, * FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER DENYING 
vs. * MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
DARYL N. PIERCE, * Criminal No. 9417-15 
Defendant(s). * 
This matter came on for a hearing on Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. The Court having heard the testimony of Trooper Rick 
Eldredge and the defendant, Daryl N. Pierce, ("Pierce") and it 
appearing that the only issue in this case is whether the evidence 
was properly obtained. The State and Defendant have agreed to a 
plea pursuant to State vs Serv if the Motion to Suppress is denied. 
Now therefore the Court being fully advised in the premises does 
hereby make the following Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law. 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
!• Piercefs vehicle was observed by Trooper Eldredge 
("Eldredge") northbound on State Highway 191 at 71 miles per hour. 
2. Eldredge stopped the vehicle and approached a late model 
Lincoln Continental driven by Pierce. Pierce was the only 
occupant. 
?o 
3. Pierce admitted driving at an excessive speed. 
4. While Eldredge was asking Pierce where he was going and 
getting drivers license and registration, Pierce stated that he had 
been to his grandmother's funeral in Tucson, Arizona. 
5. Pierce stated that he signed a contract with a drive away 
company and was delivering the vehicle to the owner in New Jersey. 
Pierce stated that the owner had left Tucson because he had become 
ill and that he had flown back home. Eldredge observed a large 
suitcase and golf clubs in the back seat. Eldredge asked Pierce 
whose belongings those were to which he answered, "they all belong 
to the owner, the only thing that is mine is the blue back pack." 
6. Pierce meant by that statement to communicate to Eldredge 
that the only thing in the car belonging to him was the blue back 
pack. 
I. Eldredge did not immediately note that the drive away 
agreement contained Pierce's name. 
8. Pierce also said he was trying to get home to be with his 
sick grandmother in Pennsylvania. 
9. Pierce told Eldredge that he was delivering the car to 
someone designated by the owner, and that he did not know the name 
of that person. 
10. Eldredge expressed his concern about the route that Mr. 
Pierce was using to reach New Jersey. 
II. Eldredge9s suspicion with regard to a possible stolen 
vehicle was not reasonable, because he failed to carefully examine 
the drive away agreement. 
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12. It is not unreasonable that Pierce did not know to whom 
he was delivering the vehicle. An individual was indicated on the 
drive away agreement and that name had been changed and the change 
initialed by the owner. 
13. Pierce was more nervous than the usual detainee, 
exhibited by his failure to look at the officer and his shaking 
hands and his overall body language. 
14. Absent controlling precedent the Court would find that 
reasonable suspicion did arise from the anxiety of Pierce, his 
inconsistent story and (but only very slightly) his choice of route 
from Tucson, Arizona to Pennsylvania. 
15. Because of the controlling precedent, the Court finds 
that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of additional 
criminal activity. 
16. Pierce was asked to go back to the patrol vehicle while 
the speeding ticket was being written out. 
17. It is the common practice of Eldredge to have the person 
proceed to the patrol vehicle on speeding violations. 
18. Seven or eight minutes had elapsed from the stop of the 
vehicle when Eldredge asked whether there were any firearms or any 
contraband in the vehicle. Those questions did not increase the 
length of Pierce's detention. 
19. Pierce stated that there were no firearms or contraband. 
Eldredge then put aside his ticket book and asked for consent to 
search for such contraband. Pierce said "sure, no problem." 
20. Eldredge then pulled out a consent to search form, read 
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the search and stated upon request to search• The Officer told 
Pierce that he would have to sign the form before the officer would 
be able to search the vehicle. 
21. Pierce understood what his legal rights were, and 
understood that he could refuse to consent to the vehicle search. 
22. Pierce was told by Eldredge that he could not search 
without Pierce signing the form. 
33* With regard to the consent the Court finds that: 
A. Eldredge did not claim any right to search. 
B. That there was no force or coercion exerted by 
Eldredge. 
C. That Eldredgevs request was phrased as a request, not 
commanded. 
D. That Pierce cooperated in allowing Eldredge to 
search. 
E. That there was no deception or trick by Eldredge in 
requesting the search. 
24. The Court finds that the consent to search was voluntary. 
However, the Court finds that at the time the consent was asked for 
that Pierce had been detained and was not free to go. In view of 
the decision of the Court of Appeals in State vs. Castner, the 
Court finds that Eldredge violated Pierce's constitutional rights 
by asking this consent to search. 
25. There was no flagrant violation in requesting consent. 
However, the consent was closely connected in time and sequence to 
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circumstance or lapse of time that would attenuate the consent from 
the violation. 
26. On the issue of standing or abandonment, the Court 
considers the facts as known to Eldredge when he conducted the 
search. 
27. Pierce made a statement that the only property that 
belonged to him was a blue back pack, intending the officer to 
understand since Pierce was driving another's car that the only 
item in the vehicle owned by Pierce was the blue back pack. 
28. The Court finds that Pierce abandoned any claim to or 
expectation of privacy in items or articles in the rear seat and 
trunk other than the blue back pack and the area immediately around 
his person. It was reasonable for Eldredge to accept this 
abandonment• 
29. At the time of the stop and conversation with Eldredge 
Pierce intended to distance himself from the ownership of any of 
the other materials within the vehicle. Bis later admissions that 
he knew of the marijuana are irrelevant to this inquiry. 
ORDER 
The Motion to Suppress is denied. 
DATED this day of August, 1994. 
Lyle R. Anderson 
District Judge 
